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as if it had been a covenant. Hunt v. Beeson, 18 Ind. 380; Higbee v. Rode-
man, supra; Sheets v. Vandalia, supra.*
The principal case could easily have been construed as a covenant. The
agreement to fence was clearly of this nature. But the same result was
obtained by finding the condition substantially performed by 86 years con-
tinuous use.
At all events P could not obtain the title here since he was holding from
an assignee of the grantor, and the rights of reentry after breach of a con-
dition subsequent cannot be assigned by the grantor but must be exercised
only by him or his heirs. Thompson v. Thompson, 9 Ind. 323; Van Horn v.
Mercer, 64 N. E. 531, 29 Ind. App. 27; Paul v. Railway, supra.
J. S. G.
DIVORCE-JURISDICTION-STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS-This was an action
for divorce. With his petition the husband filed an affidavit of residence,
setting out that he had been a bona fide resident of Indiana for two years
immediately last past, giving his address in particular, his occupation, eic.,
as required by statute. Burns Ann. St. 1926, Sec. 1097. This affidavit was
sworn to before a notary public on Dec. 14, 1928, and the affidavit was filed
with the petition on Jan. 15, 1929. Held, this was not a sufficient compliance
with the statute and the lower court acquired no jurisdiction. Klepfer v.
Klepfer, Supreme Court of Indiana, Oct. 30, 1930, 173 N. E. 232. (This
case was first appealed to the Appellate Court of Indiana and it handed
down a decision on January 10, 1930, which appeared in the weekly edition
of Northeastern Reporter, 169 N. E. 478. Later, however, this opinion was
withdrawn so that now it will not be found in the permanent volumes of the
Northeastern Reporter. The case was transferred to the Supreme Court
and it wrote the present opinion.)
Sec. 1097, Burns. supra, relates to residence and provides that "plaintiff
shall, with his petition, file with the clerk of the court an affidavit, sub-
scribed and sworn to by himself, in which he shall state the length of time
he has been a resident of the state and stating particularly the place, town,
etc., in which he has resided for the last two years past, which shall be
sworn to before the clerk of the court in which said complaint is filed."
The question immediately arises whether an affidavit executed 32 days be-
fore being filed with the petition, as was the situation here, has fulfilled
the requirements of the statute. The court said that the affidavit wholly
failed "to account for plaintiff's residence for over a month just preceding
the filing of the complaint", and that since there was "neither a literal nor
a substantial compliance with the statute" the action must fail. Powell v.
Powell, 53 Ind. 513; Miller v. Miller, 55 Ind. App. 644, 104 N. E. 588; Canan
v. Canan, 88 Ind. App. 623, 165 N. E. 263. Repeatedly this statute has been
construed as being jurisdictional, and a failure to comply therewith means
certain reversal on appeal. Hoffman v. Hoffman, 67 Ind. App. 230, 119
N. E. 18; Hood v. State, 56 Ind.-263; Smith v. Smith, 185 Ind. 75, 113
N. E. 296. As to whether the statute is jurisdictional to such an extent that
non-compliance is ground for collateral attack, it was decided in Beavers v.
* For discussions of words denoting conditions, see Scott v. Stipe, Royal
v. Aultman & Taylor Co., Summer v. Darnell, Brady v. Gregory, Jefferson-
ville R. R. v. Barbour, Gharkey v. Garat, Indianapolis R. R. v. Hood, and
Sheets v. Vandalia Ry., supra.
RECENT CASE NOTES
Bess, 58 Ind. App. 287, 108 N. E. 266, that to support such collateral attack
it must appear affirmatively from the face of the record that the court did
not have jurisdiction. Baker v. Osborne, 55 Ind. App. 518, 104 N. E. 97, is
in accord. Although in the earlier cases the courts used language which
broadly stated that the provisions of the statute were mandatory and strict
compliance was necessary, some later cases seem to have permitted a slight
relaxation in certain particulars. For instance a petition under oath con-
taining the necessary allegations as to residence may supply the place of an
affidavit, Stewart v. Stewart, 28 Ind. App. 378, 62 N. E. 1023; and the
court may properly permit the filing of a substituted affidavit of residence
after reply had been filed, Strecker v. Strecker, 86 Ind. App. 16, 154 N. E.
503. And it has been held that notwithstanding the plain language of the
statute, the oath to the affidavit may be taken before any officer authorized
to administer oaths. Eastes v. Eastes, 79 Ind. 363; Brown v. Brown, 138
Ind. 257, 37 N. E. 142; Smith v. Smith, supra. In the Eastes case the court
said there must be a substantial compliance with the statute, but no good
would be accomplished by giving it a rigid or literal construction; and in
the Brown case it was decided this provision (requiring affidavit to be
sworn to before the clerk) had been held, in effect, to be directory, not man-
datory. On the other hand an affidavit reciting that affiant had been a resi-
dent of the state for more than five years, had resided in a certain city at
a named address for more than six months, etc., was held not to be in sub-
stantial compliance with the statute because it did not show where affiant
lived the first 18 months of the two years. Hoffman v. Hoffman, 67 Ind.
App. 230, 119 N. E. 18. In the case where affidavit stated that affiant was
a resident of a certain county and had been for more than two years imme-
diately preceding, etc., that was held not to be sufficient fulfillment of the
provision requiring such affidavits to state particularly the place, town,
city, etc., in which plaintiff has been residing. Crowell v. Crowell, 82 Ind.
App. 281, 145 N. E. 780. One court summed up the situation when it said
that while only substantial compliance was necessary yet "there is nothing
in .. . any other case . . . that will justify the conclusion . . . that
the courts have ever relaxed the requirements of the statute." Hoffman V.
Hoffman, supra. Other states with statutes similar to the Indiana one have
interpreted them to be jurisdictional and have held that they must be
strictly followed, and that the provisions cannot be waived as between the
parties. Ayres v. Gartner, 90 Mich. 381, 51 N. W. 461; DeArmond v. De-
Armond, 92 Tenn. 40, 20 S. W. 422; Hinkle v. Lovelace, 204 Mo. 208, 102
S. W. 1015.
The decision of the Appellate Court in this case caused much anxiety
among the legal profession of the state since the language used was taken
to mean that Sec. 1097 Burns, supra, had to be complied with literally-
i. e., that the affidavit must be sworn to before the clerk of the court in
which the complaint is filed. If that were so, many divorce decrees rendered
in this state in the past could be attacked collaterally and great confusion
would result, for supposedly settled rights would be made doubtful and un-
certain. The opinion quoted Sec. 1097 and then said: "This provision of
the statute is mandatory, and, without such affidavit, the court acquires no
jurisdiction of the cause," and later, referring to the fact that the affidavit
was executed 32 days before it was filed, the court said: " . . . this sit-
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uation shows the reason for the statute's provision requiring the affidavit to
be sworn to before the clerk. . . ." If the court meant to require a lit-
eral compliance with the statute it would have been doing so in the face
of authorities which had specifically held a substantial compliance on this
point to be sufficient, Eastes v. Eastes, Brown v. Brown, Smith v. Smith,
supra. The opinion of the Supreme Court in the principal case recognizes
these authorities, but reverses the lower court on the sound ground that
there had been on the plaintiff's part not even substantial compliance with
the statutory requirements. J. W. S.
TERMINATION OF LEASE CONTAINING COVENANT TO REPAIR OF REBUILD
BY SUBSEQUENT BUILDING CODE MAKING IMPOSSIBLE REPAIRS OR REBUILDING
ExcEPT BY MORE EXPENSIVE STRUCTUREEDS were owners of real estate in
South Bend on which was located a store building. Mayerfield (P) was the
owner of an unexpired lease for a term of 25 years which lease had been
previously assigned to him. The lease provided that in case the premises
should be rendered unfit for occupancy, by reason of fire or other casualty,
the Ds would at once repair or rebuild such portion of the building at D's
expense, and that the rent should be abated during such period that the
premises should be rendered unfit for occupancy. In 1920 Mayerfield sublet
the premises to Kuehn (P) until 1930. The original lease was executed in
1905, at which time there was no building code ordinance. In 1922 the City
Council enacted an ordinance zoning the city into fireproof limits and pro-
hibiting the rebuilding of a building damaged more than 60 per cent by fire.
In 1926 the store building was damaged more than 60 per cent by fire.
Ds applied for a permit to rebuild which was refused by the building com-
missioners under the ordinance noted. Ds tore the damaged buliding down
and erected a new one which they rented to other persons. Mayerfield
brought an action for damages for breach of the lease and eviction, and
Kuehn filed a cross complaint asking damages for eviction. Held, for Ds,
that performance of the lease was rendered impossible by operation of law.
Poledor v. Mayerfield, App. Ct. of Ind. in Bane. November, 18, 1980, 173
N. E. 292.
The question presented by this case is: was the passage of the zoning
ordinance of such character that the covenantor is discharged from his cov-
enant because of impossibility of performance by operation of law, or was
the covenant an unqualified one and the passage of the ordinance an event
which could have been anticipated and guarded against in that contract?
If the obligation which it is sought to enforce is one which is created by
the express agreement of the promisor, it is laid down as a general rule,
subject to exceptions, that subsequent impossibility does not excuse perform-
ance. Northern P. R. Co. v. American Trading Co., 195 U. S. 439; Stewart
v. Stone, 127 N. Y. 500; Pratter v. Latshaw, 188 Ind. 204; Rowe v. Peabody,
207 Mass. 226; Barry v. U. S., 229 U. S. 47; Central Trust Co. v. Wabash
St. L. & P. Ry. Co., 31 Fed 440; Berg v. Erickson, 234 Fed. 817; Carter v.
Wilson, 102 Kan. 200; Hay v. Holt, 91 Pa. St. 88; Parker v. Macowder, 17
R. I. 674. One of the well recognized exceptions to this rule is that where
the law forbids or prevents the performance of a promise, legal when made,
the promisor is freed from liability. Schaub v. Wright, 79 Ind. App. 56;
Burgett v. Larb, 43 Ind. App. 657; Jamieson v. Indiana Natural Gas and
